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ABSTRACT:
While municipal bankruptcy as a whole is rare in the United States, since the Great Recession,
fiscal distress in municipalities is common. This is due to the compounding of decreased state
aid, declining property values and increased need of services. In these fiscally and
administratively challenging times, where the U.S. government is ripe and saddled with political
discord, high debt/legacy costs, and decreased economic stability, can cities walk the stringent
financial tightrope without falling head first? This research paper addresses the causations
leading to municipal fiscal stress, role of the state as it relates to municipal financial health and
best practices leading towards stabilization and recovery.

Keywords: municipal fiscal stress, role of state, local government management, municipal
bankruptcy
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I.
INTRODUCTION
In July 2013, the once glamorous and industrious Motown city, Detroit, filed for the largest
municipal bankruptcy in the history of the United States (Foroohar, 2013). Detroit’s bankruptcy
did not come as a surprise, in part due to the scandal and corruption charges plaguing the former
Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.

The mayor’s unethical and corruptive practices on the

taxpayer’s dime further intensified the city’s unstable finances resulting in bankruptcy shortly
thereafter (Schaefer, 2013).
While as a whole, municipal bankruptcies in America are rare, many cities are entering
similar financial predicaments, albeit with differing scale and variability. Detroit’s perfect storm
of high unemployment rates, population decline, high debt obligations, , inept/corrupt leadership,
high legal cost, bad investments, lack of funding streams and the flight of industries
compounded its misfortune and gradual descent (Schaefer, 2013).
Sadly, for Detroit, their predicament was preventable. The state of Michigan has a strong
state government, and by law can intervene in local governance during times of financial distress
by assigning an emergency manager to redirect the city back into stable financial territory (Pew
Charitable Trust, 2013). Due to political jostling between state and local government, it was not
until March 2013 (three months before Detroit filed for bankruptcy) that the city allowed the
emergency manager to govern (The Detroit News, 2014). This begs the question—if the state of
Michigan, considered a strong state government, can by law intervene in local governance during
a time of fiscal crisis, how did they allow the largest municipal bankruptcy in the history of the
United States to occur?
This research paper will address the following:
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a. the trajectory of local financial distress leading up to bankruptcy;
b. whether strong state governments are conducive to stronger local finances; and
c. stakeholder viewpoints on municipal financial management, fiscal stress and the role of
the state.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Municipal fiscal stress is complicated.

Local governments in the United States have

varying externalities that affects its financial health—not limited to environment, culture and
economic considerations. The following literature review will address the common attributes
that lead up to municipal fiscal stress found in academic journals, public policy papers, and
technical guidance from state and federal publications.
A. Overview of Municipal Externalities
The key to long-term municipal planning is having a strong financial foundation, which
includes many environmental factors that may or may not be controllable, and their effects on the
financial position of the municipality. As identified by the 2008 Guide to Financial Condition
Analysis, the Office of the New York State Comptroller’s office, the following externalities to
consider are:
i.

Environmental—Environmental circumstances consistently help detect future financial
strain (page 2). These metrics include population trends, median household income
levels, unemployment rates, property value trends, educational attainment, age and
characteristics, poverty indicators, such as numbers of single heads of households as a
percentage of your community’s population (page 2).
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ii. Organizational– Management and legislative programming creates the financial
infrastructures and conditioning in which the municipality operates (page 3). Naturally,
poor management and unfavorable legislative practices destroys fiscal prudence (page 3).
Once an unfavorable financial infrastructure is instituted, no matter how sound the
budgeting and management practices are thereafter, crisis may not be forestalled (page 3).
Manifestations of this fiscal stress will transpire in repetition in expenditures (i.e.,
salaries, fringe, contractual), recurring major expenditures by object (i.e., salaries,
fringes, contractual), debt outstanding and debt service levels, and percentage of tax and
debt limit (page 3).
iii.

Financial conditioning– Financial constraints comprising of intergovernmental duress
such as tax and debt limits, mandated expenditures, unfavorable schedules for financial
transactions confines the pathways for municipalities to control their fiscal outcomes
(page 2).
B. Devolution Revolution
Illiquidity is the key causation of bankruptcy in small cities. For most illiquid towns, the

story began with devolution.

Devolution, as described by Bowman and Kearney (2011) in

“Second-Order Devolution: Data and Doubt” is the process of localities gaining more autonomy
and authority from state governance. In sum, decentralization. Devolution gained popularity in
the 1990s and is often referred to as the “the devolution revolution” (Cole, 1999).
Bowman and Kearney (2011) illustrated that this trend has some real advantages. Of the major
advantages, it includes service delivery efficiencies, cost savings for purchased services, creative
policy making, citizen participation, greater accountability and transparency, and reducing the
legislative workload by assuming more control in local policy. Overtime, devolution brought in
8|Page
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new players in local service delivery including non-profits and public private partnerships (Cole,
1999).
Devolution’s goal was to push forward creative local policies and control that bypasses
state interception (Cole, 1999). While devolution worked efficiently in many towns, if
devolution occurs in a struggling community, not yet up to the task of implementing these
increased responsibilities, failure will follow (Bowman, 2011). More, not all, localities are good
candidates for devolution. By far, this is the largest drawback of devolution: giving too much
power and authority to a locality not equipped to handle it.
C. Type of Municipal Income and Debt
As more states devolve, state aid to municipalities decreases. As a result, cities rely on
other funding streams to facilitate their operations, including sales tax (i.e., non-property tax),
income tax, user charges and fees (i.e., special police detail, parking fees, parks and recreation
usage), property tax, and creative financing (i.e., zero coupon bonds, compound interest bonds)
(Campbell, 1983) . The largest percentage of incomes in towns is property tax. In most cities
and towns, raising taxes on its citizens is never a popular platform to resolve fiscal distress. As
such, many municipalities incur debt to finance municipal projects (Morrison, 2002).
When a municipality wants to finance a project such as a new school or a bridge, it will go
into debt by issuing bonds (Morrison, 2002). In exchange for loan, the city will pay interest
accrued for the life of the loan (Morrison, 2002). To ensure the fidelity of the borrower,
municipal credibility is monitored extensively by credit rating agencies (Morrison, 2002). A
strong credit rating is in the best interest of the municipality, as it will ensure future loans for
capital improvements (Morrison, 2002). The following are types of municipal debts:
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i. General obligation debt: General obligation bonds are long-term loans secured “full
faith and credit,” to finance large capital expenditures such as building of a new school
(Morrison, 2002). As it is a “full faith and credit” loan, it is considered a safe investing
vehicle and its lower interest rate reflects this (Morrison, 2002). If any improprieties
occurred during the issuing of this debt without proper procedures or channels—it can be
voided (Morrison, 2002).
ii.

Special obligation debt: A special obligation loan which does not pledge “full faith and
credit” and is used for borrowing on special projects such as a sports stadium to support
economic development (Morrison, 2002). This debt is paid through a designated funding
stream and only that funding stream (Morrison, 2002). It is also subjected to federal
income tax (Morrison, 2002). Special obligation debt demands a higher interest rate as it
is not secured (Morrison, 2002).

iii.

Current accounts deficits: Perhaps the most controversial type of debt, current accounts
deficits are deficits that occur in current year operations unbalanced due to unanticipated
circumstances (i.e., fire, terrorism, natural disasters, personnel strikes) and are generally
paid by short-term municipal borrowing from other municipal accounts. This is also
referred to as “cash flow borrowing” (Morrison, 2002). Cash flow borrowing is one of
the main reasons pensions are not fully funded. Often times, current pensions consumed
by retirees are in part paid by current year deductions (Morrison, 2002). Unfunded
current accounts deficits may be problematic if there are more retirees collecting pensions
than the workers who fund the pension (Morrison, 2002).
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D. The Unquiet Tempering: Unfunded Pensions
One of the most affrighting municipal debts is underfunding pensions. Affrighting because
it does not immediately show up on municipal balance sheets (Mattoon, 2011). Furthermore,
low pension funding is positively correlated to the financial stress (Kemp, 1988).
In general, there are two forms of municipal pension plans:
i.

Defined contribution—A defined contribution retirement benefit is based on the
employee’s contribution levels plus the performance of the stock market. As it is tied to
market performance, there is a level of uncertainty on the amount the pensioner receivers
during retirement (Kemp, 1988).

ii.

Define benefits—A defined benefit plan is a retirement plan where a municipality assures
a explicate benefit based on a pre-negotiated formula based on pensioner earnings, years
of service and age (Kemp, 1988). A defined benefit plan is fixed and not based on
market performance (Kemp, 1988).
At times, a municipality may determine that it is in their financial interest to defer the

funding of a pension plan, as there are no implications or disincentives (Kemp, 1988). Cities
acting on this will assume a current deficits debt (Morrison, 2002). When a municipality
declines to fund its pensions, it essentially is accepting a loan from its employees (Kemp, 1988).
By accepting this loan, municipalities are delaying their commitment and burden of payment to
future taxpayers at an increase contribution level (Kemp, 1988). This debt is real and therefore is
capable of jeopardizing the prosperity of the municipality should they default on this debt
(Kemp, 1988). Unfortunately, many cities fall into the trap of underfunding their pensions,
especially since there is an absence of ordinances and regulations that oversee this phenomenon
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unlike private sector pensions (Kemp, 1988). To offset this potential crisis, municipal leadership
must control debts to avoid future uncertainty (Kemps, 1988).
E. Municipal Financial Strain
Municipal financial strain occurs when the current operating revenues (i.e., taxes, fees,
revenue sharing, other income) are less than the current operating expenses (i.e.,
obligations debt, special obligations debt, current accounts deficits) (Kemp, 1988).

general
When the

operating revenue falls below the operating expenses, a financial strain occurs (Kemp, 1988).
Municipalities can quickly cloak this deficit by borrowing against their debt (Kemp, 1988). In
personal finance, there is a perception of good debt (i.e., student loan, mortgage) and bad debt
(i.e., credit card). This is also true for municipal finance. Good debt is considered investments
made to infrastructure, such as road or schools (Kemp, 1988). Bad debt is referenced as keeping
the current operating deficits afloat (Kemp, 1988). Bad debt will eventually result in a tax hike
or decreased municipal service (Kemp, 1988). When a municipality goes down the route of bad
debt, it generally puts municipalities in a weaker economic position that jeopardizes its standing
in the eyes of its citizens and lenders (Kemp, 1988).
F. Fiscal Relief in Challenging Times
Under state law, cities must balance their budget (Hansen, 1991). Highly resourceful
financial officers will start the course of the year by budgeting conservatively by over-estimating
spending and under-estimating revenue expectations (Hansen, 1991). Hence always producing a
surplus. Moreover, it is considered wise for financial officers to cushion a 5% yearend balance
in their general budget for unexpected expenditures (i.e., budget error, natural disaster) (Hansen,
1991). Ideally, this 5% yearend surplus will not be spent, and instead saved into a rainy day fund
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(Hansen, 1991). Moreover, to maximize additional cost savings it is important that
municipalities continually monitor, analyze and identify expenditures.
In times of budget scarcity, cities can achieve substantial savings by trimming travel or
implementing hiring freezes (Hanson, 199). Beyond this, additional targeted reductions may
include across the board reductions, furloughs, postponement in pension fund contributions, tax
increases, spending investment deferrals, layoffs, and borrowing bonds (Hansen, 1991). Finance
officers need to tread a fine line when it comes to presenting unpopular decisions, such as tax
increases, as tax increases will not solve a financial crisis. In fact, tax rates can peak at their
“revenue hill” and from there revenues may fall, which will only create further economic
affliction and inefficiencies (Inman, 1995).
During a cyclical economic downturn, governments face revenue scarcity, unemployment
escalation, increased demands for public assistance, and housing instability (Hansen, 1991). In
the 1990’s, Philadelphia encountered such a fiscal crisis. In September 1990, Philadelphia
attempted to borrow $375 million from the municipal bond market, $187 million more than the
previous year (Inman, 1995). The municipal bond market reacted with alarm and concern and
rejected their request (Inman, 1995). This sent the city into a three-year fiscal crisis (Inman,
1995). In a bind, Philadelphia had to analyze their expenditures and restructure their obligations.
This crisis resulted in an increase in their sales tax by 1 percent, two-year wage freezes for
municipal employees, and a reduction of employee benefits. Residents had to cope with reduced
public services (Inman, 1995). Moving forward, Philadelphia became more proactive in seeking
aid from state and federal resources to combat illiquidity instead of using their general funds
(Inman, 1995).

Philadelphia also became very uncompromising with their labor contract
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negotiations (Inman, 1995). In sum, to achieve fiscal relief actualization, a change in the service
delivery structure must involve the cooperation of corporations, states, and local interest groups
(Campbell, 1983).
G. Bankruptcy Predicament
State statutes dictate terms for cities should they become insolvent, and they must adhere to
these edicts (Morrison, 2002).

Generally, municipalities are unique and have differing

definitions of insolvency (Morrison, 2002). Cities are free to choose their path, as long as they
follow the law, however irresponsible (Morrison, 2002). States do have significant interest in
local financial health.

If a town defaults on their loan, by the way of contagion, other

municipalities and states by association will be affected by their actions (Campbell, 1983).
Specifically, if a municipality defaults on their loan, the state’s credit worthiness and their ability
to borrow is also compromised (Campbell, 1983). Generally, states impose debt limits for cities
and parallel governmental entities (i.e., economic developments, schools) (Morrison, 2002).
States also establishes rules to impeded towns from exorbitant borrowing (Morrison, 2002).
Some towns must seek a public referendum to debate and request an increase to public
borrowing (Morrison, 2002).
A fiscal predicament occurs when the city fails to augment revenues or raise adequate
funds to meet its legal debt obligations (Inman, 1995). In simple terms, avoiding bankruptcy is
easy: earn more than you spend. However, cities are more intricate and weave a wider net.
Four externalities unmanageable by the city that exasperate municipal finances include: (1)
economic troughs that decrease tax revenues; (2) the flight of high income generators which
results in a decrease in high-income generating tax base; (3) increase in disadvantageous
14 | P a g e

Yong-Hua He
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities
University of Massachusetts Boston
demography that necessitate additional resources; (4) reduction of state and federal aids to
municipalities (Inman, 1995). While devolution and decentralization of municipalities may yield
more local control it results in less jurisdiction on expenditure controls from the state (Inman,
1995).
H. Causations Leading up to Fiscal Stress
There are many causes that lead up to municipal distress. The following are recent case studies
that pushed municipalities to the brink of bankruptcy:
i.

Underfunding/overpromising obligations
Vallejo, CA– Vallejo promised labor unions significant obligations that could not be
fulfilled (Mattoon, 2009). By fiscal year 08/09, labor commitments alone were $79.4
million (Matton, 2009).

Unfortunately, in fiscal year 08/09 the town only had

revenue totaling $77.9 million—for the whole town operation (Mattoon, 2009)!
ii.

Lawsuits
Westfall, PA– Westfall was sued by a real estate developer after reneging on a
promise to allow for a hotel development (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). After much
legal contention, the federal judge motioned the town to pay a $20 million dollar
settlement (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013). Sadly, the town only generated roughly $1
million in revenue per year (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013).

iii.

Overextended/incorrect capital investments
Harrisburg, PA- In 2003, Harrisburg committed to build a town incinerator (Matton,
2009). Due to delays in construction, poor management, restructuring of debt, the
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cost overruns skyrocketed to $282 million dollars, a staggering amount for a town
populated by 47,000 residents (Matton, 2009).
iv.

Poor business management/accounting practices
New York City, NY— Inadequate financial practices, compounded with inept
leadership led to New York City’s inability to meet its short-term contractual
obligations in 1975 (Morrison, 2002).

v.

Poor investments
Orange County, CA- Orange County, one of the wealthiest towns in America, invested
and borrowed against high-risk funds including derivatives, inverse floaters, reverse
purchase agreements and long-term high yield bonds, which eroded in value
precipitously (Pew Charitable Trust, 2013).
I. State’s Role in Municipal Oversight
In 2012, in an attempt to address the concerns of municipal bankruptcies The National

Association for State Budget Officers produced an issue brief titled “Municipal Bankruptcy &
the Role of the States,” which outlined the following:
i.

“State laws are shaped by local crisis”— States do not hold uniform views concerning
its recognition and the legality of municipal bankruptcies (page 3). In fact, many states
do not recognize bankruptcies or implement reactive statutes to manage municipal fiscal
emergencies (page 3). As such, states may want to consider strategic legislation on
policies regarding local financial duress instead of implementing reactive legislation that
may result in unforeseen ramifications (page 3).
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ii. “Localities often resist state intervention”—During financial duress, states may
intervene and oversee local operations to control further financial ailment (page 4). Since
control of municipal finance affects retirees, employees and other stakeholders—a natural
tension may occur as states are viewed acrimoniously as cost cutting strategist (page 4).
This dynamic depends on the history of the relationship between the state and the
municipality (page 4). Transparency by the state during this transition is the key to
municipal cooperation (page 4).
iii.

“The underlying cause of the crisis matters”—When states enter into a difficult
municipal predicament, they must act with prudence as it sets precedence in their state
(page 5). States tend to assist municipalities that suffer financial distress due to external
forces (i.e., economic stress, natural disaster) and exhibit common core governmental
operations (page 5). Generally, states intervene during this time as a precaution to ward
off adverse reverberations that affect credit and borrowing charges for the surrounding
areas (page 5). States, however, resist intervening on internal causations of fiscal stress
(i.e., inept management, corruption) that chiefly point to one particular event (page 5).

iv.

“State role can have credit rating implications”—Due to the economic downturns, states
have a stake in creating a legal roadmap that helps municipalities navigate through a
period of financial distress (page 5). Declining property tax and revenues may force
municipalities to rely on borrowing to maintain some forms of liquidity (page 5). If
“looming defaults” are in the horizon, investors are deterred from loaning the necessary
funds, which will have credit implications and consequences on the municipality and
state (page 5).
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J. State’s Role in Managing Municipal Finances
When municipalities are struggling financially, states have historically intervened
(Anderson, 2012). As mentioned, no two cities are alike as it is relative to the economic and
financial conditioning. In a 2013 study commissioned by Pew Charitable Trust, nineteen states
can intervene on behalf of a city, town or county during a financial crisis (Matton, 2014). The
degree of state interference varies (Matton, 2014). Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island have a more aggressive approach to intervention (Matton, 2014). Here are the
varying degrees of state intervention:
i.

Consultancy: North Carolina founded the Local Government Commission in 1931 during
the Great Depression to address the upsurge in municipal financial delinquencies
(Matton, 2014). Notably, when a town’s reserves are under 8%, the state of North
Carolina will provide consultancy to afflicted communities or provide receivership
assistance (Matton, 2014). North Carolina has one of the most proactive approaches to
governing municipalities in financial crisis (Matton, 2014)

ii.

Oversight: Another scenario occurred in the 1970’s in New York City. At the time, NYC
was suffering a host of ailments including increased need population, inflation, high
unemployment, housing rent controls, powerful and inflexible labor unions, and
questionable accounting practices (Rabinowitz, 1976). More pressing, NYC was not able
to pay its vendors on time. As a result, the New York state legislators created a state
agency called the Municipal Acceptance Corporation (MAC) (Morrison, 2002).
Essentially, MAC transgressed from the American municipal finance rules to save NYC.
MAC pushed forth long-term bonds to pay for short-term debt in exchange for the right
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to claim NYC’s future revenues (Morrison, 2001). Moving forward, MAC has the
authority to offer final budget approval, agreement on contractors and other related
expenses (Morrison, 2002). Additionally, the New York state legislatures passed the
Financial Emergency Act, which created a seven-member board to oversee the control of
the NYC’s budget with the goal of achieving a yearly balanced budget (Rabinowitz,
1976). Upon accepting these terms, NYC had to reduced staff by 20.8%, including
higher education (-28.6%), health and hospital (-22.4%), education (-20.2%), fire (17.1%), police (-16.8%), environmental protection (-15.8%) and social services (-13.7%)
(Glassberg, 1978).
iii.

Receivership: Since the filing of bankruptcy in Central Falls, Rhode Island and Detroit,
Michigan, both states have amended their laws to allow possible receivership and state
takeovers of local governments (Anderson, 2012). The power of the laws vary. The
most drastic state intervention includes replacing all elected officials with appointees
(Anderson, 2012); abandoning all city’s local ordinances and until stability is restored
(Anderson, 2012); and democratic dissolution (Anderson, 2012). This is sometimes
referred to as “financial martial law” even though the politically correct term is
“democratic dissolution” (Anderson, 2012).
State receivership creates the most uncertainty for a city. It creates a legal limbo for the

town (Anderson, 2012). Generally, there are three main components to state receivership and
their main oversight to address fiscal instability: (1) judicial receivership to exert control to
increase taxes for immediate payment to counter credit defaults; (2) if applicable, the ability to
exercise the right to Chapter 9 bankruptcy reorganization; (3) if applicable, receivership can
allow an overseer to sort out affairs (Anderson, 2012).
19 | P a g e

Yong-Hua He
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities
University of Massachusetts Boston
The most powerful administrator for a city under receivership is the “emergency manager”
(Anderson, 2012). While municipal power and authority is facilitated by the state, the day-today operations including municipal services, taxes or land size to whom it serves continues to be
operated by the city (Anderson, 2012). In this capacity, the emergency manager has the power to
coordinate meetings, set agendas, dispose policies, and oversee activities (Anderson, 2012).
Moreover, an emergency manager may have the capacity to fire elected officials (Anderson,
2012). The most controversial executive control of an emergency manager is their ability to
renege, renegotiate, and delay collective bargaining agreements which are currently active
(Anderson, 2012).
If a town is financially reckless, they may have to abandon their democracy for state
centralization of power for the long haul (Anderson, 2012). Critics noted that emergency policies
are reactive, as some emergency mangers may want to privatize city operations, auction off
priceless public goods, and abort crucial projects or programming (Anderson, 2012). Critics
noted these quick fires are reactionary decisions that put the town’s uniqueness and cultural
identity in jeopardy (Anderson, 2012).

Tensions may arise between the state and the

municipality. This muddies the clarity of mission and further corrupts effective governance
(Anderson, 2012).
K. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Municipalities are not subject to forthright state supervision (Morrison, 2012). State legislatures
generally allow municipalities to function as an independent entity as long as they follow the
edict prescribed by law (Morrison, 2002). If a city disobeys the law, state legislators may create
statutory solutions so they are not countering the law (Morrison, 2002). On rare occasions, if a
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municipality is acting against their legal obligations, a state can create an entity to become an
overseer of the city (Morrison, 2002).
When a city believes they essentially are insolvent, there are several courses of action:
leveraging debt, receiving a bailout from state, or filing for bankruptcy. Under state law, only
the municipality can file for bankruptcy, as creditors cannot force debtors into it (Morrison,
2002). Chapter 9 protection under the Federal Bankruptcy Code deals with the insolvency
pertaining to local government. Despite federal courts trumping municipal ordinances, states can
step in as an intermediary (Morrison, 2002). A state cannot impose creditors to receive less than
their declaration (Morrison, 2002). However, a federal court can declare a decision on all
creditors (Morrison, 2002). Unlike commercial bankruptcy, creditors must accept this federal
decision and cannot appeal (Morrison, 2002).

Upon the final exchange in agreement, the

municipality is cleared from its debt.
Municipal bankruptcies are complex as they are subject to the legalities of federal, state,
and local laws, which occasionally dissent (Foroohar, 2013). The end goal is to restructure debt
obligations in a manageable systematic manner conducive to the benefit of all parties involved.
Naturally, it is in the interest of the bankrupt cities to repay their debt—otherwise, borrowers and
other stakeholders will refuse to support or funds cities in desperate need of capital or services in
the future. Herein lies the problem: bankrupt cities are in no condition to repay all creditors;
therefore, all creditors will fight separately to legally ensure their share of obligations are
safeguarded (McConnell, 1993). For general obligation bonds and current accounts deficit, a tax
increase is generally instituted to pay for these debts (Morrison, 2002). Special obligations on
the other hand, are treated “pro rata” which is divided among the creditors (Morrison, 2002).
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III.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
The goal of this exploratory research is: (a) to confirm if strong state government leads to
stronger local finances; and (b) to delve into the relationship dynamics between a strong state
government and its municipalities as it relates to fiscal distress.
To respond to the first research inquiry, this paper will examine the data gathered from the
United States Census Bureau, including the 2011 annual survey of state and local government
finances, 2011 state government employment and payroll data, and the 2011 American
community survey. The United States Census Bureau data offers reliable, comprehensive and
consistent data, which is good for benchmarking. The notable downside of using the annual
survey of state and local government finances, when compared to the comprehensive annual
financial reports (CAFR), is it does not contain financial disclosures such as upcoming schedule
of debt payments or pension obligations, which offers additional insights on the long-term
financial health of the municipality (Rivernbark, 2009). Additionally, for this research, the
designation of strong, limited, special, and no state government intervention is heavily
influenced by the Pew Charitable Trusts’ (2013) paper, “State Role in Local Government
Financial Distress.” A strong state government is not exclusive to allowing bankruptcy
authorization, laws addressing fiscal distress, and instilling interventionary programs. Instead, a
strong state government is holistic in its approach when addressing municipal fiscal distress,
which includes its willingness and ability to step in and negotiate the restructuring of
environmental, financial and organizational areas of concern.

With this consideration, this

research paper designated strength of state government as follows:

22 | P a g e

Yong-Hua He
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities
University of Massachusetts Boston
 Strong government—Over seven affirmatives confirming support of local
government in times of fiscal distress


Limited state interference—Between three to seven affirmatives addressing
support of local government during times of fiscal distress



Special state interference—Between one to three affirmatives addressing support
of local government, generally school districts or townships, in times of fiscal
distress



No state interference—Little to no interference addressing support of local
government during times of fiscal distress

Please visit Table 1 chart in the Appendix section to view the state characteristics and categories.
Lastly, a weighted ratio was created and heavily influenced by the various metrics determining
financial health as noted by Ken Brown’s 10 point test of financial condition and the
International City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) financial trend monitoring
system. This research, like many government entities, creates hybrid metrologies to measure
their fiscal health, as there is no dominant adoption of commanding indexes system (Crosby,
2013).

Generally, the indicator system adopted by the government entity is incorporated

specifically to the uniqueness of “population, land area, service levels, citizen demands, and
overall net worth” (Crosby, 2013). To ensure the usage of consistent metrics, this paper will
focus on the following stressors of financial dimension as disclosed by Rivenbark (2009):


Financial Performance—signals if the municipality’s fiscal footing is
positive or negative as a result of asset circulation (page 6)



Self Sufficiency—signals if the service transactions covers expenditures (page
6)
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 Liquidity— signals if municipality can address short term debts (page 8)


Solvency— signals if municipality can address long term debts (page 8)



Leverage— informs if the amount of total assets funded by long term debt
(page 8)

Please see Table 2 in the Appendix for the detailed breakdown of the quantitative metrics and
ratios.
To respond to the second research inquiry, this research paper will focus on the strong
state government of Massachusetts and the actors within the Commonwealth as it relates to
municipal fiscal health.

Through snowballing stakeholder interviews, this paper includes

opinions from resident, financial analyst, state aid coordinator, city manager, municipal leaders
and other public private partners dedicated to supporting strong municipal governance. All
interview questions are constructed based on the stakeholder’s field, area of expertise and
position. Some recordings were permitted and transcribed by researcher. Sample interview
questions are located in the Other section of the Appendix. Moreover, the researcher attended
the “Technological Innovation in Government Symposium: toward open and smart government”
at University of Massachusetts Boston on April 5, 2014 to supplement this research.
Additionally, one area the researcher focused is school district, as it an integral part of the
municipal operation, and as they make up about 36% of local expenditures (Census, 2011).
Furthermore, school districts operate with relative autonomy, separate from City Hall and often
overseen by the a school committee or elected officials. Adding to the intricacy, school districts
are heavily monitored by accountability laws.
The following are lists the stakeholder associations and characteristics interviewed in this
research:
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A. School department supporting 56,000 students and a FY14 budget of $934
million.
B. State agency with FY2014 budget of $5.7 billion and distributes more than $4.3
billion in state aid to cities in towns.
C. Local government with 636,000 residents covering 48 square miles with a FY14
budget of $2.6 billion.
D. Local government with 35,080 residents covering 1.8 square miles with a FY14
budget of $131 million.
E. Higher education institution that has an extension that supports and offers
municipal consultancy in performance management, organizational studies,
research, charter reform and regionalization.
F. Not otherwise specified category is specific to the anecdotal testimonies noted in
the Technological Innovation in Government Symposium.
The researcher inserted italicized direct quotes from stakeholders in the summary of findings and
recommendation sections.
IV.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The recent economic decline has wrecked the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ budget

and its ability to distribute expansive state aid to municipalities as it had in the past.
Unfortunately, this economic trend is not reversing. As a result, Massachusetts has become more
devolved, encouraging local government to become more independent from state funding and
have promoted municipalities to raise their revenues locally. This is trend is aligned with
Massachusetts’ adherence to the philosophy of “local control, local decisions.” As a progressive
state, the only exceptions made to localities with regards to state aid funding are those with
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significant shifts in demography such as higher population or poverty rates. Furthermore, state
aid funding aligns to a state aid driven formula relative to its local expenditures, property taxes,
and general wealth.

Wealthier towns are assigned the status of “minimum aid,” while

impoverished towns in the Commonwealth receive larger portions of their revenue from state
aid.
In this research, through stakeholder interview the following are summaries of findings:
1. A stronger government does not lead to stronger municipal finances
Based on the data analysis used in this research paper, there is no evidence that suggests a
strong state government leads to stronger local government finance. In fact, six of the ten local
governments with a high weighted ratio signifying strong liquidity, positive demographics, and
financial standing have no state interference to local governance. Only two strong governments
are in the top ten with Massachusetts ranking at #3 and Rhode Island ranking at #10. Both states
have suffered shaky muncipal grounding in the past (Chelsea in 1991 and Central Falls in 2011
respectively). The bottom ten state governements have five states that have the designation of
strong state governments. Please visit the Appendix for the methodology and designisation
distinguishments.
2. Fiscally distressed entities have faint adherence to core municipal operations
Core municipal operations are simple: public safety, public works, and education. In
sum: keep the streets clean, the population safe, and educate the next generation. As simple as
the mission is, some municipal leadership in fiscally distressed towns often forget the core
mission, especially when corruption is involved.

Naturally, loose fiscal oversight and

management has significant consequences for the residents.
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In 1991, a city in Massachusetts, due to corruption and bad fiscal management, became
insolvent and unable to meet its obligations to its vendors and employees. As a result, the city
was left in squalid conditions: crime spiked, and their school system, chronically labeled as one
of the lowest performing in the state, was handed control to a local university. One of the only
redeeming qualities during this crisis was the relative affordability of the city, which attracted a
higher need population.
One resident who attended public school student at the time commented, “Education
wise, I was fine, as I was a quick learner. However, I cannot say the same for the students who
had special needs or language barriers. Services provided [by the school district] were not
sufficient [for this population].” Not surprisingly, it is the neediest population in the city that
suffers most from loose and poor local municipal governance.
3. The culture sets the foundation for organizational decisions
Leadership lays the cultural foundation for a organization.

Decisions, actions and

policies set by the top, trickles downwards to the administrative players who implement the
policies. If a mission is not clear or can be loosely translated it creates chaos. While strong
leaders may help correct some organizational dysfunction, they cannot correct a broken system.
Additionally, many departmental leaders are often hired due to their expertise but may have
limited skills in budgetary or business management. This is especially true for school districts.
For many novice principals and school leaders, they are in desperate need for operational and
technical budgetary assistance.

Unfortunately, due to limited resources, even budget

professionals assigned to tasks are overwhelmed with their workload. As such, many leaders
default to politicking to obtain adequate resources, “for every rule you have 15 exceptions and if
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push hard enough… you can be the exception.” Hardly a strong foundation to make sweeping
changes or creation of strong fiscal policies.
4. The externalities effect the conditioning of organizations
To preface: the spending of municipal monies are often times complicated and not
transparent. A common “fire” that occurs in the school district is, “how do I access my money?”
typically asked during the end of the fiscal year. The reason is that to spend municipal funds
there are a lot of cumbersome contract and legalities to consider. “You have to go through a lot
of regulations and rules, which a lot of people are not taught well or taught only once and then
are expected to remember for 20 years.” In this world, municipal rules and regulations are “seen
as a hindrance” which complicates the delivery of services. As a result, some department heads
and school leaders delay the spending on monies, as it is too complicated to consider, until last
minute. This often leads to waste or inefficiencies.
5. If there is state or federal aid, competition may be fierce
For schools districts in Massachusetts, they are foreshadowing an increase in the cap on
charter schools. This will result in more competition for monies and resources. “The increase in
charter schools takes a portion of state and federal funding from us.” Unfortunately, this is not
the only grievance. Some charter schools attract or poach some of the best public schools
students, and reject lower performing students. This leaves mostly special needs and English
language learners in the public schools system, populations who are considered more expensive
to support or an added burden to the already struggling school districts.
6. Accountability laws drive state monitoring
High municipal salaries and benefits are a hot topic in Massachusetts. It was reported
that the Massachusetts’ state capital, Boston, 1 in 4 municipal employees earned over $100,000
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whereas only 7% of its state employees earn over $100,000 (Ryan, 2014). In a state that heavily
subscribes to the philosophy of “local control, local decisions” they cannot and will not dictate
this an area of concern. As interviewee commented, “As long as they meet net school spending
and follow the law we don’t dictate” how they spend their funding. The only exception for state
intervention is when “accountability laws come into play to put pressure on the municipalities.”
Specifically, when student performances are consistently poor and the student’s legal rights to
gain a proper education is possibility compromised, then that state would consider a “more
invasive approach.”
Not surprising for many urban school districts, the highest expenditure and fastest rising
cost for school districts are special education and English language learners, two populations
where service delivery is monitored, as they are attached to accountability laws. Due to the
myriad legal ramifications, it is “difficult to reign in the inefficiencies” and “sometimes… we just
need to send another bus… on the road… unnecessarily… as we have a commitment.”
7. Budget drives programming
As a city manager poignantly stated, “If you do not have budget balanced every year, and if you
are not generating enough revenues than what you are planning to spend, then you can’t really
do much else.” This statement is often resonated by many in municipal and state employees.
The highest rising cost and area of concern is Human Capital and benefits. Many municipalities
are facing declining revenues, and upcoming collective bargaining contract negotiations are
foreseen to be contentious. The worst-case scenario for municipalities? All of the bargaining
contracts may “cumulatively” receive their raises all at once. The results will be disastrous for
their budget and future programming.
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8. Local government must take initiative to seek financial relief
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is struggling financially; as such, local government must
take initiative to seek financial relief. “During the economic downturn, there was a decrease in
state aid. There was not as generous annual increase in state aid. Districts cannot rely on state
aid as a annual source of revenue with increase. If they wanted to increase their revenue, it had
to be done locally.” Additionally, “We certainty encourage regionalization at the state level,”
but it is “difficult to convince a high performing district to take on the problem district” as “a lot
incentive must happen.”
While the Commonwealth has passed laws to help cities seeking financial relief, it was
acknowledged, “There is not a lot of money.” Instead, some cities seek technical assistance from
the Commonwealth’s Administration and Finance department, “To discuss resources. To
streamline services. To help regionalize services. And in some cases to privatize service.” One
city leader noted that some transactions with long-term cost savings have a very substantial
upfront cost, “We can’t go to the voters and ask for $300 million to restructure [debt] this one
time. It doesn’t work that way…the state does not have that kind of resources.” As such, the city
must consider the entrepreneurial options for fiscal relief, “buying and selling land is one
avenue.”
9. Laws created to support municipalities in fiscal distress may not resolve
underlying problem
While rare, the commissioner of elementary and secondary education may use
accountability laws to exert their authority over the school’s budget. However, true change
occurs “through the appointment of a receiver.” It is then at the state has more authority and
more say on how the funds are spent and “in terms of personnel—hiring and firing.” Among the
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many concerns to receivership, one worry is that “it is so new. It is hard to say whether state
fiscal control has done anything to improve” the status and the future of the school districts.
There was at least one expectation.

Due to fiscal distress, the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts stepped in to help the regional school system of Athol-Royalston, located in a
former industrial town in western Massachusetts. While the school district was not assigned a
receiver, it exhibited compromising characteristics: high percentage of special educational
students, students consistently performing “poorly” on state standards exams and the population
suffers from significant “poverty.” Due to Athol-Royalston’s fiscal stress, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts enacted legislation to provide financial relief. In Athol-Royaliston’s response to
the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education in the District Review
Report (2013), they reported their “business office has worked with the Department of Revenue
to manage the restrictions put on the district by Chapter 50 of the Acts of 2006, An Act
regulating the financial conditions in the Athol-Royalston Regional School District, which
allowed the district to borrow $1,000,000 from the state and which was necessitated by the
financial condition of the district just before the present superintendent assumed his position.”
Moreover, the district “yielded substantial savings (2013),” piggybacking on the state’s
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission insurance rates. Unfortunately, despite their new
financial stability, “the students still do not perform any better.”
10. Your elected officials and school committee are generally laymen and not
technical experts
There is tons of blame to go around when municipalities enter into a fiscally distressing
predicament. This includes, but is not limited to: school committees, selectman, other elected
officials, and the superintendent. The underlying problem there is a “certain amount of due
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diligence that they did not do. You should not agree to everything the [director] tells you”—as a
stakeholders should be objective.

Obviously, a certain amount of “technical assistance” is

needed but not provided. In sum, “finance committee, select boards are lay people and not
technical experts. The state can only do so much because the state has limited resources and
people.”
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the extended economic decline, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is continuing

to struggle financially. With state aid declining, local government must improve its efficiencies,
generate cost savings and increase entrepreneurial spirits. Naturally, this is easily said than done.
The following are recommendations based on the stakeholder interviews:
1. Municipalities must expand beyond their core services
Core municipal operations seem simple: keep the streets clean, keep the population safe,
and educate the next generation. Exceptional municipalities must expand upon this mission.
Truly exceptional towns reach for great schools, economic growth, job opportunities, dining and
shopping options, health and medical access, and an active nightlife. This formula attracts young
professionals or high-income couples seeking respite and cash to spend. While ‘gentrification’
has become an ugly word, it is necessary for municipalities who desire to take their cities to the
next level.

A delicate balance of demography, including high and middle to low income

families, is the key to long-term municipal stabilization.
In Massachusetts, a city formerly in receivership, economic and demographic change is
gradually occurring.

Newer market rate housing is available, shopping opportunities are

plentiful, and health and medical access is convenient. Moreover, developers and business
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owners eager to make this investment in the city. The leadership of this city is mindful of
changing the dynamics. They are managing this integration, constantly conscious of the need for
balance, as the city is still heavily populated by low income immigrants and minorities. “We
spend a lot of time thinking about gentrification and how we manage it. Not sure any community
has managed it well. We have a chance because we are a smaller community.”
2. Management must have its house of cards in order
While strong leaders can navigate through organizational dysfunction, they cannot
correct or lead effectively in a broken system. While human capital is the key to reform, human
capital can also be its downfall. In a school system interviewed for this research, the school
system’s fiscal distress are well documented, as loose hiring practices in the past have come to
haunt them financially. During the economic peeks, the school district kept “hiring more and
more people, which means higher salaries and benefits.” Human capital now makes up to “75 to
80%” of their budget. Layoffs are imminent. The interviewee noted, while “stricter hiring
policies” in the past would have eased the current fiscal turmoil. Compounding to this school
district’s troubles is the perception of abuse among its workforce. “The worst is long- term
leaves.” Unfortunately, the “lack of capacity… lack of experience… not very process driven” are
among the reasons that potential abuses are not being investigated and among the many reasons
that lead to the school district’s questionable predicament. What would help is “accountability…
checking in on relationships, [accurate] reporting of information.” Right sizing an organization
with an ideal workforce is difficult, especially when you have the intricacies of bargaining units
and potential discrimination lawsuits. As a human resource person noted, “[human resource in a
government] is a glass filled with dirty water [dirty water represents the less than stellar
employees], you must have a pitcher with clean water [the clean water represents the ideal
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employees] and you must pour into the glass until all the dirty water is gone.” All this takes a
substantial amount of time and investment. As stated, human capital is the key to reform.
Human capital can also be its downfall.
3. State must offer supportive legislative programming and technical support
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 351 towns and cities (County of Dukes
County, 2014). The smallest town in Massachusetts is Gosnold with a only 120 registered voters
(County of Dukes County, 2014). As one municipal performance management specialist noted,
“There are significant challenges to scaling down.” Moreover, “there is an inward correlation
between population and the number of elected officials,” meaning that, “the smaller you get the
more elected officials” your municipalities. “Therefore, less centralized authority that can make
things happen.” This is not an ideal pathway to municipalities who desire reform and change.
If the decline in state aid is a fixed reality, then localities must take the initiative to
generate revenue— the state is obligated to assist and present to municipalities with best practice
roadmap to help them navigate through this decline. Specifically, states must offer technical
assistance to guide them through the navigation of budgeting, financing, contracting, charter
reform, and regionalization. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts must take the initiative
without impeding on local autonomy consultancy to assist them to help municipalities beef up
their cash reserves to prevent and cushion future turmoil.
4. A change in town management could be effective
A city leader noted that a change in town government was a game changer for a
municipality previously in receivership.

Formerly a mayoral form of government, the

interviewee hinted that this created a toxic Machiavellian environment. “When the mayor looks
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down at the end of the hallway, he sees 9 aldermen,” i.e., the mayor effectively sees competition
instead of those invested in the transformative success of the mayor, perhaps, due to the
aldermen’s own ambitions of securing the mayoral position in the future. Now, with the change
in government, the interviewee noted the city manager now sees the city council as partners.
More, it helps that the city councilors must take one-year reprieve should they desire and seek
out the city manager position. This the new form of government: it frees the councilors from
“plotting and planning, constantly defining our actions, against political pressures. We can
spend our time, thinking of the good things we can change such as economic development
activities.” Moreover, the new charter “requires us to do a 5 year financial planning” which
allows the city to focus on the years ahead.
5. Institute performance management measures
Many local towns are not subscribing to the trend of the moment: big data. In fact, many
small towns in America practice the no data trend. In fact, even in the 21st century, many
municipalities continue to store the data via “carbon paper, microfilm” locked in their archaic
filing cabinet system. “There is no impetus to use a culture of data, management and decisions
based on data.” Naturally, this lack of “feedback loop” goes nowhere and falls flat. Perhaps, it
is municipalities own lack of ambition or resources, but “a lot of cities and towns are stuck
because of this.” In small cities and towns that do not subscribe to the work order system, they
cannot have a “system of accountability because you don’t know what they are doing and you
can’t track what they are doing.”

This also applies to area such as overtime and other

expenditures. It seems very basic, but this is the inclusive to the spectrum of data usage in small
towns. Through his consulting role, our interviewee has heard the gambit when it comes to
excuses, “there are cut backs or we don’t have time.” For fully operating and functioning
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municipalities the best-case scenario is this, “we have a good data set, we aggregate it and
present to public and use we use data to fix stuff.”
6. Civic engagement is crucial to the future of the municipality
In 1991, one of the cities in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered receivership.
At the time, the city was heavily populated by low-income minorities from working class
backgrounds. Perhaps cultural, many residents did not trust local politicians and did not engage
in civic participation. Corrupt municipal officials took advantage of the lack of civic
participation by profiting from their unconsciousness, pillaging the city and its resources. Post
receivership, the demographics continue to be the same, and “civic participation is a constant
challenge.”
A city leader spoke a great deal about the concept of social capital and civic engagement,
“the strategy to get people to know each other. Connect so people can look after your kids;
notify others if there is a job available, or if they saw your kid do something good or bad. The
goal is to build social capital.” This will ensure future civic engagement and benefits for the
municipality.
VI.

CONCLUSION
In the statement of research, the goals of this exploratory research are: (a) to confirm if

strong state government leads to stronger local finances; and (b) to delve into the relationship
dynamics between a strong state government and its municipalities.

This research paper

concludes that (a) a strong state government does not lead to stronger local finance; and (b) the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, considered a strong state government, adheres to the
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philosophy “local decision, local control.” As such, as long as its municipality adheres to the
law, the Commonwealth will rarely intervene in its municipal operations.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, like many other states suffering through an
economic decline, has fewer resources and aid to distribute for local operations. Notably in this
research, many stakeholders in Massachusetts have a strong desire for “technical assistance.”
While municipalities are not looking for intervention, they desire state’s guidance to navigate
them through the budgeting, financing, contracting, charter reform, and regionalization process.
The increase in technical assistance observes with the belief that local government will continue
to local control of their business affairs. In sum, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts must
respect, recognize and embrace this municipal desire to ensure the financial health and wellness
of their state.
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY, DATA AND GRAPHS
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Table 1. State Government Characteristics

State

Strong Government
Assignment

Receiver/
Financial
Manager/
Overseer/
Coordinator

State
Agency

Financial
Control
Board/
StateAppointed
Board or
Commission

Restructure
Finances:
Renegotiate,
Approve, or
Issue Debt

Restructure
Finances:
Labor

Restructure
Finances:
Taxes, Fees,
Credits

Emergency
Financing
(Enhanced
Credit
Backing,
Loans,
Grants)

Supervise
Finances/
Technical
Assistance
(Including
Budget
approvals)

Disincorporation/
Dissolve/
Consolidate
Local
Government

Pew
Comments:
Law
Designating
Local Fiscal
Distress

Pew
Comments:
Bankruptcy
Authorization

Pew
Comments:
Intervention
Program

Alabama

No State Interference

No

Yes (bonds
only)

no

Alaska

No State Interference

no

no

no

Arizona

Special State Interference

yes iii

yes

no*

Arkansas

No State Interference

no

yes

no*

no*

California

Special State Interference

yes iv

conditional
(use of a
neutral
evaluator or
declaration of
fiscal
emergency)

Colorado

No State Interference

no

limited

no

Connecticut

Strong Government

no

conditional

yes

Delaware

No State Interference

no

no

no

Florida

Strong Government

yes

conditional

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Georgia

No State Interference

no

no
(specifically
prohibited)

Hawaii

No State Interference

no

no

no

Idaho

No State Interference

no

yes

no v

Illinois

Strong Government

yes

yes

Indiana

Strong Government

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

n/a vi

limited

yes

yes

yes

yes vii

no

yes
no*
no

Iowa

Special State Interference

yes viii

no (with
exception)

Kansas

No State Interference

no

no
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Kentucky

No State Interference

no ix

conditional

no

Louisiana

No State Interference

no

conditional

no

Maine

Strong Government

yes

no

yes

Maryland

No State Interference

no

no

no

Massachusetts

Strong Government

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

yes

Michigan

Strong Government

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

Minnesota

Special State Interference

yes x

yes

no

Mississippi

No State Interference

no

no

no

Missouri

No State Interference

no

yes

no*
no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Montana

No State Interference

no

yes (but not
counties)

Nebraska

No State Interference

no

yes

no

Nevada
New
Hampshire

Strong Government

yes

yes

no

yes

Limited State Interference

yes

no

no

yes

New Jersey

Strong Government

yes

New Mexico

Limited State Interference

New York
North
Carolina

Strong Government

North Dakota

No State Interference

Ohio

Limited State Interference

Oklahoma

No State Interference

Oregon

Limited State Interference

Pennsylvania

Strong Government

yes

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

Strong Government

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

no

no

no

yes

conditional

yes

no

yes

no

yes

yes

limited

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

yes

yes

conditional

yes

No State Interference

no

yes

no

South Dakota

No State Interference

no

no

no

Tennessee

Strong Government

yes

yes

no

yes

Texas

Limited State Interference

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

Strong Government

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

40 | P a g e

Yong-Hua He
Fiscal Stress in American Municipalities
University of Massachusetts Boston
Utah

No State Interference

no

no

no

Vermont

No State Interference

no

no

no

Virginia

No State Interference

no

no

no

Washington

No State Interference

no

yes

no*

West Virginia

No State Interference

no

no

no

Wisconsin

No State Interference

no

no

no

Wyoming

No State Interference

no

no

no

(Pew Charitable Trust, 2013)
Strong Government Assignment:



Strong government—Over seven affirmatives confirming support of local government in times of fiscal distress



Limited state interference—Between three to seven affirmatives addressing support of local government during times
of fiscal distress



Special state interference—Between one to three affirmatives addressing support of local government, generally school
districts or townships, in times of fiscal distress



No state interference—Little to no interference addressing support of local government during times of fiscal distress
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Table 2. Financial Indicators Used to Measure Fiscal Condition
Indicator
Type

Financial Indicator

Formula

High need population

Percent under 18 plus over 65 years of
age

Poverty

Percent of poverty households or
public assistance recipients

Higher ratios denotes higher need population as a whole

Expenditure

Core operating expense ratio

Operating expenditures/total
expenditures

Higher ratio denotes there is more spending on core services for the municipality

Expenditure

Employee per thousand over
population

Number of government
employees/population

Higher percentage suggest more reliance on government support or low entrepreneurial industries

Expenditure

Operating deficits

Total revenues/Total expenditures

Operating ratios greater than 1.00 indicates a budget surplus – less than 1.00 a deficit

Revenue

Intergovernmental reliance

Intergovernmental operating
revenue/General fund revenues

Higher the ratio means more reliance on state and federal resources

Revenue

Revenue per capita

Total revenues (excludes capital
projects)/population

Higher revenue per capita suggest more solvency for services

Revenue

Property tax revenues

Property tax revenues/General fund
revenues

Higher revenue per capita suggest more solvency for services

Solvency

Surplus (deficit per capita)

Total surpluses (deficits) / population

Deficits indicate a lack of funds, a needed increase in revenues, and room for service improvements

Solvency

Current ratio

Current assets / Current liabilities

Ratio is an indication of a government’s ability to meet short-term financial obligations with current
assets

Solvency

Long-term liability ratio

Long-term Liabilities / Total assets

Higher ratio indicates lower level of ability to pay off long-term debt or a strain on future resources

Demographics
Demographics

Significance
A higher percentage of under 18 and over 65 years of age suggest a higher need population.
Potentially attached to higher long term costs

(Rivenbark, 2009), (Brown, 1993), (Maher, 2009), (Maher, 2013), (Wang, 2009)
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Table 3: Designation of State Government and Weighted Ratio
Using the research methods explained in the research metholodies section, there is no data
suggesting strong government leads to stronger muncipal finance. The ranking is as follows:

Ranking
1

State
WY

Weighted
Ratio
3.58

State Government
No State Interference

2
3

MT
MA

2.15
1.76

No State Interference
Strong Government

4
5
6

ID
AK
NH

1.66
1.65
1.62

No State Interference
No State Interference
Limited State Interference

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

CT
SD
MD
RI
OK
ND
NE
LA
WI
ME
DE
VA
IL
MO
KS
MS
IA
MI
OH
WV
MN

1.47
1.46
1.23
1.02
0.98
0.89
0.82
0.72
0.66
0.49
0.45
0.41
0.40
0.35
0.33
0.30
0.25
0.23
0.20
0.16
0.11

Special State Interference
No State Interference
No State Interference
Strong Government
No State Interference
No State Interference
No State Interference
No State Interference
No State Interference
Strong Government
No State Interference
No State Interference
Strong Government
No State Interference
No State Interference
No State Interference
Special State Interference
Strong Government
Limited State Interference
No State Interference
Special State Interference

28

CO

0.09

No State Interference

29

TN

0.06

Strong Government

30

AZ

0.05

Special State Interference

31

GA

(0.02)

No State Interference

32

VT

(0.13)

No State Interference

33

PA

(0.17)

Strong Government

34

AR

(0.18)

No State Interference

35

HI

(0.26)

No State Interference

36

NM

(0.30)

Limited State Interference

37

OR

(0.31)

Limited State Interference

38

SC

(0.38)

No State Interference
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39

FL

(0.39)

Strong State Government

40

UT

(0.44)

No State Interference

41

IN

(0.57)

Strong Government

42

NC

(0.67)

Strong Government

43

KY

(0.70)

No State Interference

44

AL

(0.77)

No State Interference

45

CA

(0.89)

Special State Interference

46

NJ

(0.97)

Strong Government

47

WA

(0.99)

No State Interference

48

NV

(1.10)

Strong Government

49

NY

(1.41)

Strong Government

50

TX

(2.35)

Limited State Interference
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Table 4: Data and Graphs:
 Count of analysis
Statistics
Strong Gov
N

Valid
Missing

50
0

Strong Government
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Strong State Government

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

14

28.0

28.0

28.0

Limited State Control

5

10.0

10.0

38.0

Special State Control

4

8.0

8.0

46.0

Weak State Government

27

54.0

54.0

100.0

Total

50

100.0

100.0
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 Descriptive statistics on indicators
Descriptive Statistics

Population 2011

N

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

Std. Deviation
Std. Error

Statistic

50

37101352

567329

37668681

6219258.80

980122.248

6930510.877

50

.0027829

.0001023

.0028852

.000662530

.0000794449

.0005617604

Personal Income Per Capita

50

17137

20670

37807

27551.78

559.425

3955.733

Percent under 18+ over 65

50

.15

.25

.40

.2970

.00373

.02638

50

.14

.08

.22

.1427

.00434

.03070

50

.19

.69

.88

.8080

.00638

.04512

50

.00278291569

.00010229328

.00288520897

.0006625299023

.00007944491698

.00056176039531

50

.13

.92

1.06

1.0019

.00435

.03074

50

.51

.17

.68

.3878

.01174

.08303

50

6.56

1.97

8.52

4.4447

.16964

1.19952

50

.46

.09

.55

.2688

.01509

.10671

Number of Government
Employees/Population

Percent of Poverty Households or
Public Assistance Recipients
Operating Expenditures/Total
Expenditures
Number of Government
Employees/Population
Total Revenues/Total Expenditures
Intergovernmental operating
revenue/General Fund Revenues
Total Revenues (Excludes Capital
Projects)/Population
Property Tax Revenues/General Fund
Revenues
Total Surpluses (Deficits) / Population

50

.77

-.41

.36

.0058

.02088

.14763

Current Assets / Current Liabilities

50

2.49

.43

2.92

.8924

.05469

.38672

Long-term Liabilities / Total Assets

50

1.77

.34

2.11

1.2363

.05293

.37424

Valid N (listwise)

50
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 Positive financial indicators

Limited State
Interference

No State Interference

Special State
Interference

Strong Government

Positive Financial Indicators

(1.00)

TN
RI
PA
NC
NY
NJ
NV
MI
MA
ME
IN
IL
FL
CT
MN
IA
CA
AZ
WY
WI
WV
WA
VA
VT
UT
SD
SC
OK
ND
NE
MT
MO
MS
MD
LA
KY
KS
ID
HI
GA
DE
CO
AR
AK
AL
TX
OR
OH
NM
NH

Total Surpluses (Deficits) / Population

1.00
Property Tax Revenues/General Fund Revenues

2.00
Operating Expenditures/Total Expenditures

3.00
Current Assets / Current Liabilities

4.00
Total Revenues/Total Expenditures
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 Negative financial indicators

Limited State
Interference

No State Interference

Special State
Interference

Strong Government

Negative Financial Indicators
TN
RI
PA
NC
NY
NJ
NV
MI
MA
ME
IN
IL
FL
CT
MN
IA
CA
AZ
WY
WI
WV
WA
VA
VT
UT
SD
SC
OK
ND
NE
MT
MO
MS
MD
LA
KY
KS
ID
HI
GA
DE
CO
AR
AK
AL
TX
OR
OH
NM
NH

Long-term Liabilities / Total Assets

0.50
Percent under 18+ over 65

1.00

1.50

Percent of Poverty Households or Public Assistance Recipients

2.00
Number of Government Employees/Population

2.50

3.00

Intergovernmental operating revenue/General Fund Revenues
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 Authorities state descriptive statistics

Authoritive States Descriptive Statistics
Positive

Authoritive States Descriptive Statistics
Negative

Special State Interference
MIN

MIN

Strong Government

No State Interference
Limited State Interference

Limited State Interference
MEDIAN

MEDIAN

Strong Government
Special State Interference
No State Interference

MAX

Limited State Interference
Strong Government
MAX

Special State Interference

Special State Interference
Limited State Interference
Special State Interference
Limited State Interference

Special State Interference

(1.00) -

No State Interference

1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00

Limited State Interference
- 0.501.001.502.002.503.003.50
Percent of Poverty Households or Public Assistance Recipients
Percent under 18+ over 65
Number of Government Employees/Population
Intergovernmental operating revenue/General Fund Revenues

Total Surpluses (Deficits) / Population
Operating Expenditures/Total Expenditures

Total Revenues/Total Expenditures
Property Tax Revenues/General Fund Revenues
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SAMPLE STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONS
Budget
1. What do you see as the role of city government?
2. What is your impression of the city’s financial condition?
3. Describe a time when you had to prioritize services in order to meet budget
parameters. How did you manage competing interests?
4. Describe a time when unforeseen budget expenditure affected your budget forecast? How
did you reallocate resources?
5. Personnel expenses are the largest expense. How does your agency manage this rising
expenditures?
Financing
1. Do you experience with debt financing? Please give an example. What are the biggest
challenges to debt financing in your municipality?
2. In your budget planning process, do you earmark for a deteriorating infrastructure?
3. If applicable, describe the most successful capital improvement project you were
responsible for? What made it successful?
4. What is your opinion of “pay as you go” financing of maintenance and capital projects?
Special assessments? Special taxing districts?
Internal Administrative Relations
1. Please speak of a time when you had to deal with ay constituent that disagrees with you
with regards to financing/funding of projects? How did you resolve?
2. Let’s discuss personnel issues:
a. Have you been at the bargaining table and been actively engaged in negotiating an
agreement?
b. Have you experienced mediation, fact finding or arbitration? Which ones?
c. Do you consider the financial ramifications?
3. What is your perception of the local government’s ability to provide adequate funding for
long term liabilities?
4. What steps have you taken to improve sustainability?
5. Share an example of a time when you used financial information and/or other program
relevant information to support or drive an organizational decision. What challenges did
you face and how did you handle them?
External Administrative Relations
1. What is intergovernmental relationship at your agency? How do you leverage state
resources and grant funding for projects?
2. What steps have you taken to create valuable partnerships to leverage relationships?
3. What external considerations do you find crucial to your planning process?
4. How do you deal with special interest or single interest groups?
Management
1. What in your opinion is the most serious issue today in local government management?
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